For decades, plaintiffs opposing summary judgment in Missouri have reached for a familiar phrase: that summary judgment is an “extreme and drastic remedy” to be granted only with great caution. Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court put that rhetoric to rest in Wilkinson v. Farmers Holding Companies, 732 S.W.3d 93 (Mo. banc 2026). The unanimous opinion held squarely that “summary judgment is not an extreme or drastic remedy.” The decision is a meaningful course correction that brings Missouri’s summary judgment practice back in line with the standard the Court announced more than thirty years ago.
The Dispute in Wilkinson
This case arose from a service letter claim. Lucas Wilkinson worked as a wet plant foreman until his employment was terminated in January 2022. He later sent a certified letter requesting a service letter under § 290.140, RSMo, and, receiving no response, sued Farmers Holding Companies d/b/a Capital Sand, Inc. for violating the statute. Farmers moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wilkinson had not sent his request to—or sued—his actual employer, the legal entity from which he received his W-2s. The circuit court granted summary judgment, and the Supreme Court took the case on transfer from the Court of Appeals.
Missouri Supreme Court Rejects the “Extreme and Drastic Remedy” Label
Wilkinson’s lead argument was a classic one: that the circuit court erred by granting the “extreme and drastic remedy” of summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained. The Court rejected the premise outright. It explained that this was not a new pronouncement but a return to first principles, pointing to its 1993 decision in ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1993), which traced the history of Missouri Civil Procedure Rule 74.04, acknowledged that summary judgment had “historically” been regarded as an “extreme and drastic remedy,” and abandoned the “slightest doubt” standard for denying summary judgment.
The Court repeated what it established in ITT:
Rule 74.04 sets out the requirements for summary judgment, and “summary judgment is not an extreme or drastic remedy.”
Most importantly for those of us who litigate these motions, the Court issued a clear mandate that any cases holding or suggesting that summary judgment is an extreme or drastic remedy should no longer be followed. The opinion expressly abrogated the appellate decisions most often cited for the discredited “drastic remedy” formulation: Clark v. SSM Healthcare St. Louis, 666 S.W.3d 210 (Mo. App. 2023) and Boone County v. County Employees’ Retirement Fund, 26 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Mo. App. 2000).
The Summary Judgment Standard
Stripping away the loaded language does not change the protections built into the rule; it simply restores the correct framework. Summary judgment remains proper when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On review, the record is still viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, who receives the benefit of all reasonable inferences. And an appellate court still reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same criteria as the trial court. What Wilkinson removes is the thumb-on-the-scale rhetoric that invited courts to deny well-supported motions out of an exaggerated sense of caution.
A Reminder About Rule 74.04(c)(2) Compliance
The opinion is also a useful teaching tool on how to oppose a summary judgment motion—and how not to. Wilkinson’s response failed because it did not comply with Rule 74.04(c)(2). The rule requires a respondent to set forth each of the movant’s statements of fact in its original paragraph number, admit or deny each one, and support every denial with specific references to discovery, exhibits, or affidavits demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Instead, Wilkinson filed a document titled “Answer and Counter Affidavit,” renumbered the paragraphs, admitted and denied the movant’s facts in bulk, and provided no specific record citations supporting his denials.
The consequence is dictated by the rule. Any response that fails to comply “is an admission of the truth of that numbered paragraph,” and facts not properly supported are “deemed admitted.” Because his response was deficient, Wilkinson admitted the truth of each of the movant’s material facts and failed to establish any genuine issue for trial. The lesson for litigants is straightforward: the procedural requirements of Rule 74.04(c)(2) are not optional, and bulk denials resting on the pleadings will not preserve a factual dispute.
De Novo Review Does Not Excuse Preservation
Finally, the Court rejected a creative attempt to use the de novo standard as an escape hatch. Wilkinson raised a new argument in his reply brief—that the defendant was required to plead his statutory noncompliance as an affirmative defense under Rule 55.08—and devoted most of oral argument to it. The Court declined to consider it. Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief present nothing for appellate review, and de novo review “does not alter that appellants always bear the burden of establishing error whatever the standard of review.” As the Court emphasized, considering an unpreserved argument would force it to “become an advocate” for the appellant and exceed its role as an error-reviewing court.
Takeaways for Missouri Practitioners
Wilkinson is an important clarifying decision. It confirms that summary judgment is a legitimate and important procedural tool rather than a disfavored last resort. For parties seeking dispositive summary judgments, the opinion removes a rhetorical obstacle and aligns Missouri practice with other jurisdictions and with the merits-focused standard set out in its procedure rule.
This post is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. If you have questions about how this case may affect a pending or anticipated matter, please contact our Appellate Team.
