Brandes v. Bothwell Regional Health Center, WD 87735
Opinion by Martin, J.; Ardini, P.J., and Ahuja, J., concur
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District recently addressed an issue of first impression in Missouri: whether the “Massachusetts Rule”—the doctrine relieving a land possessor of the duty to remove naturally accumulated snow and ice when such conditions are general throughout the community—must be affirmatively pled as an affirmative defense in order to support the entry summary judgment for possessor of land upon which the plaintiff allegedly fell and was injured.
The Court held it does not. The Massachusetts Rule is a legal doctrine adopted in Missouri that negates the required duty element of a negligence claim, and does not function as an affirmative defense. Accordingly, application of the Massachusetts Rule may support the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant possessor of land without being specially pled.
Factual Background
In February, during a winter weather event impacting the general Sedalia, Missouri area, Larry Brandes drove to Bothwell Regional Health Center upon learning that his wife fell after driving to their daughter’s home earlier that morning. Upon arriving at the hospital, Brandes slipped on snow/ice covering a sidewalk leading into the hospital emergency room. Brandes complained of the sidewalk condition when he entered the hospital. Brandes was examined by emergency room staff and released. Brandes later filed a premises‑liability claim alleging negligence.
The hospital moved for summary judgment based on the Massachusetts Rule, arguing that the snow and ice present on its sidewalk was the result of naturally accumulated winter conditions occurring generally throughout the Sedalia area, thereby eliminating any duty on its part to remove the snow and ice from its property.
After additional discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment, finding the following uncontroverted facts:
- there was continuous snowfall in the Sedalia area from the early morning hours when Brandes’s wife fell, while Brandes’s wife was transported by ambulance to the hospital, and while Brandes drove to the hospital up until sometime before his and his wife’s discharge from the emergency room later that day;
- Brandes cleared snow from his truck as he left to drive to the hospital that morning;
• Brandes drove through snowy and slushy conditions on area roads to get to the hospital that morning; - no effort had been undertaken by the hospital to modify or remove the snow/ice on its sidewalk; and
- the wintry conditions outside the hospital in its sidewalk were consistent with wintry conditions throughout the Sedalia area.
Further, the trial court found no evidence in the summary judgment record that the hospital voluntarily assumed a duty of clearing its sidewalks of the wintry accumulation, either by agreement or through a course of conduct.
Standard for Summary Judgment
The Western District reviewed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, stating that a defending party seeking summary judgment demonstrates its right to judgment as a matter of law by establishing facts negating an element of the plaintiff’s claim, establishing that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence supporting a required element of its claim, or facts supporting a properly pleaded affirmative defense. Montgomery v. Coreslab Structures (Missouri), Inc., 697 S.W.3d 766, 770 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).
The appeal turned on which prong of this test, if any, applied.
Is the Massachusetts Rule an Affirmative Defense?
Brandes first argued that the trial court’s entry of summary judgment based upon the Massachusetts Rule was improper because the hospital never pled the Massachusetts Rule as an affirmative defense in its answer to the petition. Brandes correctly argued the legal principle that summary judgment cannot be based on an unpled affirmative defense.
The Court acknowledged that Brandes correctly explained the legal principle regarding the interplay of an affirmative defense and summary judgment, but rejected Brandes’s argument by holding that the Massachusetts Rule was not an affirmative defense.
Not an Affirmative Defense
The Court clarified that an affirmative defense accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true but avoids liability based on additional facts. To the contrary, the Massachusetts Rule does not accept plaintiff’s factual allegation as true but denies the existence of facts required to prove a prima facie case of negligence. The Massachusetts Rule precludes a finding of the underlying tort by negating the duty element required to prove negligence.
If the wintry accumulation on the hospital’s sidewalk was a condition natural and general to the community, the hospital had no duty to its invitees, and the negligence claim failed as a matter of law.
The Western District held that hospital’s position was a direct challenge to the plaintiff’s ability to make a prima facie case—not an affirmative defense that must have been pled under Rule 55.08.
No Genuine Dispute of Material Fact
The Court also affirmed the trial court’s findings that:
- there was no genuine factual dispute as to general wintry conditions in the Sedalia community;
- • Brandes’s argument that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was wintry precipitation occurring when Brandes fell was inconsequential given the uncontroverted evidence of a continuous snowfall shortly preceding his fall; and
- the road, sidewalk, and weather evidence established the “general community”condition required to apply the Massachusetts Rule.
The Court acknowledged that the presence of a weather condition throughout the “general community” is a fact question normally left for a jury to decide but stressed that the issue on summary judgment is whether there exists a genuine dispute regarding that fact. Here, the record was one‑sided. and precluded any finding that there was a genuine dispute as to the wintry weather conditions throughout the Sedalia community.
No Assumption of Duty
Brandes also argued the hospital assumed a duty to remove snow and ice despite the general community wintry weather conditions because the hospital had:
• a Director of Facilities, and
- a snow removal policy.
The Court rejected both arguments.
Missouri precedent holds that having a snow removal policy, alone, does not show the voluntary assumption of a duty to clear snow and ice as an exception to the Massachusetts Rule despite the presence of general community wintry weather conditions. The course‑of‑conduct exception under the Massachusetts Rule requires actual alteration of snow or ice. O’Donnell v. PNK (River City), LLC, 619 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021).
There was no summary evidence that the hospital took any action to alter or remove the natural accumulation of snow/ice from the sidewalk prior to Brandes’s fall.
Key Takeaways
- The Massachusetts Rule negates the required element of duty in a negligence action. It is not an affirmative defense.
- Defendants may rely on the Massachusetts Rule under a general denial, without pleading it.
- The Massachusetts Rule may apply to negate the element of duty even if the wintry precipitation has ceased prior to the time of the fall.
- Having a “policy” is not a “voluntary assumption” of duty.
- The “voluntary assumption of duty exception” to the Massachusetts Rule requires actual physical alteration of the accumulation of snow or ice.
- Summary judgment is appropriate when the uncontroverted facts record show the presence of the winter conditions were general throughout the community.
Why This Matters
The decision clarifies pleading and practice for premises liability cases involving the natural accumulation of snow and ice. Defendants need not plead the Massachusetts Rule as an affirmative defense to prevail on summary judgment—so long as the summary judgment evidence demonstrates the absence of duty.
The distinction between an affirmative defense” and “negation of duty” is subtle but significant, particularly for timing, burden allocation, and trial‑court discretion.
